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The Enlarged EU and Ukraine:
New Relations
The borders of the European Union and Europe do not currently coincide,
nor will they do so after the EU’s next eastern enlargement. How will relations
be after enlargement between the EU and countries to the East, the so-called
Wider Europe? This group comprises Moldova, Ukraine, and Belarus, the countries
which have widely different aspirations vis-a-vis the Union. Largely owing to the
challenges of deepening integration, internal reforms and enlargement,
challenges presented by these countries have received limited attention from
the EU, in a marked contrast to the Western Balkan countries.
This ambivalence has left a country like Ukraine neglected, in spite of its
persistent efforts in seeking closer ties with the Union. In 1996, the intention to
join the EU was first voiced, and, in June 1998, a strategy on Ukraine’s integration
with the European Union was adopted, formally establishing Ukraine’s
membership of the EU as a long-term strategic goal. A more detailed programme
for Ukraine’s integration with the EU was adopted in September 2000. Since
then Ukraine has repeatedly articulated its principal foreign policy objective –
membership of the European Union.
The Union has so far been reluctant to acquiesce to this desire, considering
the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA), which came into force in
1998 and which is due for renewal by 2008, as a sufficient and appropriate
framework for future relations. Mindful also of the precedent set by relations
with Turkey and experiencing enlargement ‘overstretch’, the EU has been
I. Justification
6unwilling to acknowledge any prospect of membership for Ukraine.
Ukraine has done a lot to undermine the credibility of its stated intentions.
Ukraine’s pro-European declarations have not so far been matched by deeds, as
evidenced by stuttering economic and political reforms. The ‘stop-go’ pattern of
economic reforms, combined with a marked regress in the democratization
process in recent years and social deprivation on a massive scale, has created an
image of Ukraine as a case of ‘post-Soviet failure’. But Ukraine has not experienced
the type of conflict or crises characterizing the experience of several countries in
the Western Balkans, something which, ironically, would most likely have pushed
Ukraine up the EU’s agenda.
Since 2000, Kyiv has flooded EU capitals with a series of initiatives for enhanced
co-operation, the only effect of which has been to create a sense of ‘Ukraine
fatigue’ in Brussels and the capitals of EU member states. The failure of Ukrainian
officials to get the attention of their western European counterparts is beginning
to elicit the perception of exclusion from ‘EU-Europe,’ and significant and
increasingly widespread dissatisfaction among Ukrainian diplomats, experts and
policy-makers. It has not gone unnoticed that the cooperative and constructive
way adopted by Ukraine towards the EU is less effective than the more assertive
policy, such as those of, for instance, Russia and Turkey.
There are a number of reasons why the imminence of enlargement gives an
urgency to the task of overcoming the current impasse in EU-Ukrainian relations.
Although Kyiv welcomes enlargement, it has repeatedly expressed concern over
negative consequences of the step for Ukraine. Of particular concern is the
introduction of the Schengen regime for the external border policy of the new
EU member states in central and eastern Europe. The removal of barriers to the
movement of people between the former Soviet Union and its satellites in central
and eastern Europe in the early 1990s was one of the main benefits of the ending
of the Cold War. The enlargement process now threatens to partially reverse this
process, to the detriment of the wellbeing of the people on both sides of the
future eastern border of the EU. It now seems that the final removal of the ‘Iron
Curtain’ will be accompanied by the raising of a new ‘paper curtain’ a few hundred
kilometres to the east.
More than a Neighbour
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Despite proclaiming the aim of developing good-neighbourly relations after
the next round of enlargement, until 2002 the EU paid scant attention to the
negative external effects of enlargement on its future neighbours. Although the
overall effects of enlargement are widely expected to be positive for east-central
Europe, the ‘benign neglect’ of Ukraine on the part of the EU is not conducive to
fostering good neighbourly relations.
In order to avoid a new dividing line in Europe, a more coherent and durable
basis for relations with Ukraine is needed. This would aim, in the short term, to
limit, where possible, the negative consequences of enlargement and thereby
counteract the growing sense of exclusion of Ukraine; and in the longer term,
the aim would be to enable the EU to extend its constructive influence more
forcefully to aid Ukraine’s transition to a liberal market-based democracy, in a
similar fashion to that seen in east-central Europe. The postponement of any
attempt to exploit the new opportunities created by enlargement to develop
relations with Ukraine would be detrimental to the objectives that the EU sets
itself in the Wider Europe, notably promoting stability, prosperity, shared values
and the rule of law. In other words, the Union is in danger of contributing to the
development of a scenario, which it wants to avoid.
Rather than focusing on the present political predicaments associated with
the Ukrainian power elite in general and key political figures in particular (as of
spring 2003), the aim of this policy paper is to propose a medium- to long-term
strategy towards Ukraine. It is in the interest of both the EU and Ukraine not to
equate the EU’s attitudes towards the incumbent president with those towards
the country at large. A more sophisticated long-term approach is overdue for
EU-Ukraine relations, one of the key relationships that to a significant extent
will determine the degree of (dis)unity and (in)stability in Europe.
I. Justification
81. The need for a new EU strategy towards its European neighbours
The EU needs to address the process of foreign policy formulation following the
upcoming, ‘big bang’ enlargement. This paper proposes that this policy should
be divided into two parts:
a. European Affairs, which would include policy towards all European countries
that are not members of the EU. There are three such groups: 1 – countries currently
acknowledged as candidates for EU membership (Bulgaria, Romania, Turkey), 2 –
European countries that at present do not seek EU membership (such as the
remaining EFTA countries), and 3 – countries for whom the prospect of membership
is very distant (i.e. some Balkan countries, post-Soviet countries as Ukraine, Belarus
and Moldova). The countries covered by the prospective ‘European Affairs Policy’
are, needless to say, very different. The principle of differentiation would thus
need to be a central element of such a new European policy.
b. Global Affairs, where the EU would like to be in the future one of the main actors.
These two policies need different tools, as recognized in the ‘skeleton’ Constitution
of the EU, where a special article is proposed for the EU’s European neighbours. A
new portfolio on ‘European Affairs’ could be one of the main tools in the
implementation of the ‘European affairs policy’ in the next Commission. The
Commissioner on ‘European Affairs’ should be responsible for the negotiation
process with candidates on the one hand, and for the development of relations
II. Ukraine in the context
of the EU’s European policy
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with countries which will be in pre-negotiation position on the other, as well as for
relations with European states, which are not seeking membership.
This proposed division creates particular challenges for relations with Russia.
While important aspects of the relationship clearly pertain to ‘European Affairs’
(for example, the Kaliningrad issue), Russia wants to be a player in ‘Global Affairs’,
and the EU-Russia relationship is likely to have a global component far beyond
the EU’s relations with its other European neighbours. In its strategy on the EU,
Russia clearly underlines that it wants to be an equal partner with the EU as a
whole, and that it does not seek either membership or association with the EU.
Thus, a special arrangement needs to be worked out for relations with Russia,
covering both their European and global aspects.
2. ‘Special neighbourhood policy’ as a first step but not as the final objective
The idea of ‘special neighbourhood policy’ for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova,
which developed from the Wider Europe debate initiated by the UK in April
2002, divides the post-Soviet space (excluding the Baltic States) into Russia on
the one hand, and three other Western states in the Commonwealth of
Independent States (CIS) on the other. That distinction is reasonable: in terms of
location, population, and size, those three countries are unmistakably European
countries, while Russia is a country-continent.
The post-Soviet space (excluding the Baltic States) has until now been regarded
as rather homogenous by the EU, with assistance programmes such as Tacis
tailored for the entire CIS plus Mongolia. The idea of a ‘special neighbourhood
policy’ for Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova implies that the EU should promote a
more differentiated policy towards the CIS. Relations with Ukraine, for example,
should not automatically be placed in the context of relations with Russia, as
these countries have different strategic aims for their relationship with the EU.
Likewise, the EU ought not to treat Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova as a
homogenous group, because the stance of each country towards the EU is
different. In light of this heterogeneity, the EU could be more successful if it
customised policies towards each of those countries.
II. Ukraine in the context of the EU´s European Policy
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There is another problem within the idea of ‘special neighbourhood policy’.
The policy, conceived in Luxembourg in April 2002, tends to reduce relations with
the new neighbours to problems of migration, borders and international crime.
EU policy should not only concentrate on threats and fears associated with new
neighbours, but also needs to promote a more positive, constructive approach
towards them. Such an approach could help in the development of good relations
not only between the EU and those countries but also among themselves, as has
been the case in the Balkans, where Stabilization and Association Agreements and
implementation of specific provisions were conditional on regional co-operation.
However, any such effort must avoid creating the impression that post-Soviet states
are being pushed towards more closely integrated intra-CIS arrangements or treated
as a bloc of undifferentiated countries.
More than a Neighbour
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Ukraine seeks an association agreement (with the prospect of membership),
as its medium-term goal. In fact, the record of the EU’s relations with non-member
states suggests that an association agreement linked to the prospect of
membership is the most effective foreign policy instrument for exercising a
constructive influence over non-members. Thus, the aspirations of Ukraine offer
the Union an opportunity which it risks failing to grasp. By elaborating a set of
conditions and benchmarks that would need to be met by Ukraine in order to
obtain a prospect of membership, the EU could provide strong and clear incentives
for the reform process in Ukraine. The extension of this foreign policy instrument
to Ukraine is not designed to lead inevitably to membership for Ukraine (which
in any case would be a distant prospect) but is justified in terms of mobilizing
effects of the conditionality of pre-associate and associate status. But given the
prevailing constraints within the Union, the nature of relations ought to be
tailored to the ‘needs’ of Ukraine in order to maximize the EU’s constructive
influence over the country but without the constraints of premature, binding
commitments.
A mere ‘neighbourhood agreement’ (effectively a hybrid of the PCA and a ‘weak’
association agreement) devoid of the prospect of membership, is unlikely to put an
end to the demands of Ukraine, or, most importantly, serve as an important driving-
force for achieving the overarching aim of the EU in Wider Europe – stability and
prosperity. The merits of association agreements (designed as an alternative to,
III. The EU and Ukraine
– road map for building
a new relationship
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rather than a stepping stone for, membership), have been limited, except in the
instances where the associate country had clear reasons for not joining the EU
(such as Iceland). The appeal for Ukraine of an agreement which would not pave
the way to membership would be limited, and therefore unlikely to offset the calls
for membership, given the firm conviction in Ukraine that only potential members
attract genuine attention and commitment from the EU. The strategy proposed in
this paper aims to take advantage of the fact that the European Union is a powerful
integrating force in Europe, despite being a weak foreign policy actor.
The ‘road map’ proposed here encompasses short-, medium- and long-term plans
for relations between Ukraine and the EU, and can be summarized as follows:
A. Short-term: Political declaration
B. Medium-term: Association-phase
C. Long-term: Accession-phase
Most attention in this section and the rest of the paper is given to stages A and B,
which are the novelties in terms of European integration, as C, the long-term scenario
(if or when that could take place), is well pounded for in terms of literature.
Stage A
1. Political Declaration
The formulation of the EU’s future policy towards new neighbours should precede
or, at the latest, coincide, with the accession of the current candidate states to
the Union in May 2004. This would also send a clear signal as to the European
prospect for Ukraine prior to the presidential elections, which are scheduled for
autumn 2004.
This declaration should take the form of a purely political statement by the
EU designed to deliver a strong, unambiguous message of the importance of
Ukraine as a direct neighbour that is seeking closer integration with the EU. The
More than a Neighbour
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declaration should explicitly acknowledge (or, as a minimum, not rule out) the
prospect of membership for Ukraine and spell out the road-map of future
relations. More specifically, however, the declaration should list the criteria (that
is, explicit conditions) for opening negotiations on a new agreement, which would
considerably upgrade Ukraine’s relations with the EU.
2. Implementation of conditions for negotiating a new agreement
The above mentioned criteria (conditionality) would include current short-term
priorities (WTO accession, implementation of specific provisions of the PCA),
some of which it may be assumed would already have been implemented by the
time of the political declaration. However, the conditionality for starting
negotiations on a new agreement should be broader and more «political» in
scope than just technocratic requirements, thereby building on the experience
of applying the Copenhagen criteria and the requirements of the Council of
Europe. However, in order not to attenuate the mobilizing effect of political
conditionality, these should be a softer variant of the Copenhagen criteria,
requiring an improvement in areas such as fairness and freedom of elections,
human rights, justice system, and freedom of the media.
It should be underlined that all the possibilities inscribed in the Declaration,
which would pave the way to a new agreement, should be made conditional
and come into force only after the necessary steps have been taken by Ukraine in
the implementation of political and economic reforms. The detailed and explicit
set of priorities as well as built-in conditionality would lead to step by step
integration only if and when Ukraine fulfils its objectives and obligations, subject
to an evaluation and continuous monitoring mechanism.
Stage B
3. Negotiation and ratification of a new agreement
Many European countries have wide-ranging agreements with the EU, which
could serve as models for the institutional framework of a new EU-Ukraine
agreement. In particular, the agreement with Ukraine could be modelled on the
III. The EU and Ukraine – roadmap for building a new relationship
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association agreements signed by the east-central European states in the 1990s,
especially given the desirability of a strong ‘political dialogue’ with Ukraine.
Apart from emphasising a strong ‘political dialogue’ with Ukraine, the new
agreement should embrace JHA and CFSP issues, missing in the PCA. The
institutional framework would consist of the standard set of institutions (such as
association council, committees and so forth), which, as a rule, do not grant
participation in decision-making within the EU.
Moreover, over a longer time and depending on the progress of integration,
some broadening could also be provided for in the agreement, for example, by
allowing for participation in the numerous committees assisting the Commission
in preparing new legislation (modelled on the EEA agreement), de facto
participation in Council deliberations but without the right to vote (Schengen
association agreements), and the setting up of independent agencies mirroring
EU institutions (modelled on the EFTA Surveillance Authority and Court of the
EEA Agreement). One could also envisage deeper and more extensive association
with other EU policies, such as is currently in place for the CFSP (association of
candidate states) and the ESDP (non-EU NATO members). Flexibility would be an
inherent feature of the agreement.
4. Implementation of the new agreement
Only the full implementation of the agreement coupled with the fulfilment of
Copenhagen-like criteria could pave the way to giving Ukraine candidate status,
followed by an opening of accession negotiations.
Note that there is a potential gap between phases 3 and 4, that is between
the end of phase 3 (with the signing of a new agreement), and the beginning of
4 (entry into force of the new agreement). This can be solved through interim
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The following parts of the paper are a detailed explication of the A and B
phases of the ‘road map’ in various areas of EU policy towards Ukraine.
1. Economic integration
The EU and Ukraine are currently engaged in several processes aimed at
liberalizing bilateral trade and integrating Ukraine into the global economy.
Completion of these negotiations and implementation of the resulting provisions
could constitute the trade policy conditions for initiating negotiations on a new
association agreement between the EU and Ukraine. More specifically:
WTO membership for Ukraine
The main short-term priority concerning trade is Ukraine’s accession to the WTO.
Trade liberalization under a new EU-Ukraine agreement should aim beyond the
requirements of WTO membership, and Ukraine’s membership should be a condition
for initiating negotiations of a new agreement between the EU and Ukraine.
Granting of full market economy status
Market economy status is currently granted only to Ukrainian companies on a
case by case basis. Conferring such a status on the Ukrainian economy as a whole
would have a modest economic impact on the EU, but would be politically
important in Ukraine. The EU’s unwillingness to grant full market economy status
IV. Elements of a new relationship
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to Ukraine is weakening the position of pro-European reformers in the country
and fuels perceptions of exclusion, the latter heightened by the EU’s decision to
confer such a status on the Russian economy in 2002.
Removal of quotas and finalization of market access negotiations
When current market access negotiations are completed, an important step
towards the free trade area envisaged in the PCA would have been taken. Quotas
on EU imports of textiles from Ukraine were recently removed, and an initial
agreement has been reached on the removal of steel quotas, but this still remains
a difficult issue.
Tariff- and quota-free trade alone is likely to have a limited economic impact,
and the economic provisions of a new contractual agreement between Ukraine
and the EU should go beyond these processes. The average tariffs are either
zero or low, and Ukrainian import tariffs are considerably higher than EU import
tariffs. There is thus limited scope for the EU to make significant concessions,
and the modest benefits of a gradual reciprocal reduction would in the short
term benefit EU exports to Ukraine more than Ukrainian exports to the EU.
A gradual phasing out of the current asymmetric trade regime between
Ukraine and the EU should also be envisaged. But the Ukrainian economy is
unlikely to be able to withstand the competitive pressures of the EU market for a
long time to come, and the new agreement should therefore maintain the
principle of asymmetric trade liberalization, as in the Stabilization and Association
process with countries of the Western Balkans. As EU tariffs for Ukrainian imports
are in general quite low, a continuation of this would have a negligible economic
impact on the EU, but a comparatively stronger positive economic impact on
Ukraine, and would signal a tangible commitment by the EU towards Ukraine’s
European choice.
One could envisage a new agreement in which the EU complies with the
conditions of free trade from the date of entry into force of a new agreement,
with a time-table for the implementation by Ukraine of the same provisions,
leading to the free trade area allowed for in the PCA. These provisions should be
broader in scope than under the PCA. In light of Ukraine’s natural advantages in
More than a Neighbour
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agriculture, providing market access in this area is particularly important.
In the medium to long term, one could envisage Ukraine’s gradual inclusion
in the EU’s single market by the adoption and implementation of the relevant
parts of the acquis communautaire in Ukraine. Ukraine is currently developing
a scoreboard for priority areas in legislative approximation. Building on this,
a mechanism should be established to ensure both the adoption and, crucially,
the implementation of EU rules and regulations in Ukraine.
Concerning the ‘four freedoms’ of the single market – the free movement of
goods, services, labour and capital – the most sensitive issue is likely to be the
movement of labour. Quotas for labour migration have been arranged bilaterally
between Ukraine and the Czech Republic, and between EU member states and
other third countries. A new agreement should encourage such bilateral schemes,
with a view to their gradual extension to include all EU member states.
Remittances submitted by temporary migrant workers in the EU would benefit
the Ukrainian economy, while returnees would bring with them skills and
experiences likely to further Ukraine’s transition.
Finally, Ukraine needs to be taken into account when similar economic
partnerships are developed with other neighbouring countries. Considering for
instance the strong economic links between Russia and Ukraine, the gradual
deep integration envisaged bilaterally between the EU and Russia (the ‘common
European economic space’) and the EU and Ukraine (new agreement) will affect
economic relations between Ukraine and Russia. Although it is neither necessary
nor desirable to merge the two processes, some co-ordination is required to
avoid unintended yet potentially negative consequences.
2. Involvement of Ukraine in the EU’s energy policy
Ukraine will remain one of the most important transit countries for energy from
Russia (above all, gas but also crude oil) to the EU. The EU should keep Ukraine
informed about the main directions in the EU-Russian Energy Dialogue, and in
the case of issues directly connected with Ukraine, the EU should consult Ukraine.
This type of action would help in the building of mutual trust between the EU
and Ukraine.
IV. Elements of a new relationship
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Opportunities should be provided for Ukraine to become more involved
participant in the EU’s energy projects, in particular those pertaining to the
transportation of energy from the Caspian region to Europe. An optimum way
for the EU and Ukraine’s interests to realize an oil pipeline project along the
route Odesa-Brody-Gdansk should be found and its exploitation started.
3. Justice and Home Affairs
Integration in the domain of justice and home affairs (JHA) has made great strides
in recent years. As Ukraine becomes a direct neighbour of the EU after the next
enlargement, it is likely to play an increasingly important role in confronting
many of the main challenges in JHA in the years to come.
The introduction of the Schengen visa regime is the most visible negative
external consequence of EU enlargement for the new neighbouring states, and
considering the many millions of people crossing Ukraine’s western border each
year, is especially pronounced vis-a-vis Ukraine. The candidate countries are
gradually adopting EU visa policies, which include a requirement for visas from
Ukrainian citizens to enter the EU. This has already had a negative impact on
trade and the development of civil society, in particular in the border regions.
The short-term priority should be to find ways to limit the negative impact on
Ukraine of the introduction of the Schengen visa regime by the EU candidate
states. Many of the potential remedies are well known, such as providing for
low cost or no cost visas, the possibility of issuing long-term multiple-entry visas,
upgrading of border facilities to prevent congestion at border crossings, advanced
electronic techniques to speed up border procedures and such like.
The inadequate consular capacity of EU member states currently acts as a
constraint on the movement of persons, and the possibility of establishing
common EU consulates is frequently mentioned as a potential remedy.
Considering the large-scale traffic across the border between Ukraine and the
enlarged EU, in particular across the Polish-Ukrainian border, western Ukraine is
a good location for a possible pilot EU consulate.
In the medium term, the aim should be the removal of the visa requirements
between Ukraine and the EU. This would obviously require a considerable effort
More than a Neighbour
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from the Ukrainian authorities on a vast range of JHA issues such as border
management, illegal migration, and crime. A necessary first step is the conclusion
of readmission agreements with the EU. Such agreements should also be
encouraged between Ukraine and its other neighbours. There is also a need for
agreement between Ukraine and Russia on their common border, although it
should be underlined that as a matter of principle, progress in JHA co-operation
with Ukraine should not be subject to its relations with other countries.
This process would be facilitated by the development of more stringent
surveillance mechanisms to monitor implementation. A scoreboard is already in
place in the Action Plan on Justice and Home Affairs. This could be developed
along the lines of the Commission’s biannual internal market scoreboard, which
could be monitored either by the EU, jointly, or by Ukrainian authorities themselves.
In the latter case, one could consider the establishment of an independent body
set up for and by Ukraine, which would be given a similar role to that of the EFTA
Surveillance Authority towards the EFTA members of the EEA.
A more ambitious long-term aim would be Ukraine’s gradual inclusion in
what is now known as the Area of Freedom, Security and Justice (AFSJ). The
nascent AFSJ already extends beyond the borders of the EU through the close
association of some EFTA states with EU co-operation on JHA, including
participation in the Schengen Agreement and the Dublin Convention, as well as
association with Europol. Similar association could be envisaged, progressively
and in the longer run, as elements of a new EU-Ukraine agreement.
4. CFSP and ESDP
Ukrainian-EU relations in the sphere of the Common Foreign and Security Policy
(CFSP) and the European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) seem to be
progressing well. At the Seville European Council in June 2002, agreement was
reached on establishing a Ukrainian military liaison to the EU Military Staff
(EUMS), and consultation and co-operation. One could here envisage including
Ukraine in the so-called 15+15 format (with the EU candidates and non-EU NATO
members). At the July 2002 EU-Ukraine summit, the possible use of Ukrainian
transport planes for ESDP missions, and more specifically using the Police Training
IV. Elements of a new relationship
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Centre in Kyiv for the EU police mission in Bosnia, were discussed.
Ukraine clearly has something to contribute to the EU’s common defence
policy. Particularly, the idea of using Ukrainian military transport aircraft in the
EU’s military units should be supported, and modalities found for
implementation. The EU could consider the creation of common military units of
Member States and Ukraine, based perhaps on the Ukrainian-Polish battalion
that already exists.
Ukraine also has a potentially useful role to play in the formation and
realization of the CFSP, in particular concerning its eastern dimension. A more
active EU policy towards the disputes in Moldova (Transdniestria) and Georgia
(Abkhazia) could benefit from closer co-operation with Ukraine. Russia’s
exclusive right to peacemaking activities in Georgia does not correspond to
the principles and long-term interests of the EU. Ukraine can serve as a bridge
to the strategically important Caucasian region as well. Ukraine’s participation
could also contribute to the formulation and realization of the EU’s strategy
concerning the Black Sea region.
5. Regional and cross-border co-operation
The concept of a ‘Europe of regions’ has to be extended into Ukraine. If neither
Kyiv nor Brussels are now prepared for practical integration, cities such as Lviv
and Lublin, Uzhgorod and Koshice, Lutsk and Chelm are willing to solve the
problem of the division of Europe at the micro-level. The regions and the frontier
towns should be given such an opportunity through the maintenance and
development of the instruments of co-operation, most of all in the form of
Euroregions.
The regional policy of the EU has to become an instrument to ensure softness
on the frontiers between the new members of the EU and their neighbours,
primarily Ukraine. At the regional level, the liberalization of the visa and migration
regime can be introduced along the western border of Ukraine.
Within the bounds of the frontier regions experimental mechanisms of
temporary legal job arrangements for Ukrainian citizens for a limited period
may be established, with the provision of social guarantees and maintaining
More than a Neighbour
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norms of labour protection. Care would have to be taken to develop such
arrangements in co-operation with local actors in the eastern regions of the
new member states, so as to avoid possible tensions relating to the high levels
of unemployment that prevails in many such regions.
The western regions of Ukraine are a priority zone for establishing a pan-
European communication infrastructure. Investments into the European transport
corridors A3 (Berlin – Dresden – Wroclaw – Lviv – Kyiv) and A5 (Triest – Lubliana
– Budapest – Chop – Lviv) should be energized.
Development of a tourist infrastructure in the western region of Ukraine, in
the Carpathian mountains, in particular, should form an investment-inducing
idea for European capital through a programme of investment climate recovery
in the region and creation of a favourable environment for business activities
and tourism.
6. Assistance
The EU provides considerable amounts of economic assistance to Ukraine,
through the EU budget, national budgets and through international financial
institutions. In considering an upgrading of EU-Ukraine relations, there are two
principal questions concerning economic assistance. First, should EU assistance
to Ukraine be targeted differently? And secondly, should EU assistance to Ukraine
be increased?
EU economic assistance to Ukraine is channeled primarily through the Tacis
programme. The distinctions between the assistance in this programme and that
provided to EU accession candidates on Ukraine’s western border (the Phare,
SAPARD and ISPA programmes) are very marked, reflecting the priority accorded
to the enlargement process.
Amounts of assistance
First, there are large differences in terms of the amounts of economic assistance
provided. In the 2000-2006 financial perspective, the enlargement candidates
will receive almost 1200 euro/capita from the EU budget, while Ukraine and the
other CIS countries will receive 13 euro/capita. In 2002, the EU has planned for
IV. Elements of a new relationship
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77 million Euros in assistance to Ukraine, which accounts for less than 2% of the
EU’s external actions budget, excluding aid to the accession candidates. Compared
with the previous budget, Ukraine and the other CIS countries saw their share of
economic assistance drop slightly in the 2000-2006 EU financial perspective,
primarily due to increases in aid to the Balkans. Although this allocation is slowly
reducing the economic disparities between the candidates and the EU, it also
contributes to widening the socio-economic gap between Ukraine and the
candidate countries. However, considering the inflexibility of the EU budget and
the massive demands on it due to the next enlargement, and unless Ukraine is
acknowledged as a potential EU membership candidate and could thus be eligible
for enlargement funds, EU assistance to Ukraine is unlikely to increase significantly
within the current financial perspective (2000-2006).
One option that would increase assistance but leave the EU budget alone
would be to allow the European Investment Bank (EIB), the EU’s financing arm,
to provide funding in Ukraine. Throughout the 1990s, the EIB was not allowed
to operate in the CIS. However, the Stockholm European Council in March 2001
opened up EIB financing in Russia through the Northern Dimension
Environmental Partnership. This could now be extended also to Ukraine.
There are strong arguments – the size and proximity of Ukraine to the EU; the
relative poverty of Ukraine vis-a-vis the EU; and the precariousness of positive
political, economic and societal developments in the country – in favour of
increasing EU economic and financial assistance to Ukraine.
Type of assistance
The different groups of programmes also provide different types of assistance.
Whereas candidates receive substantial investment support, the Tacis programme
provides mainly technical assistance to Ukraine, although the share for investment
support was increased in the latest and current Tacis regulation. Financial and
technical assistance to the EU candidate countries aims to prepare them for
membership and is specifically targeted towards enhancing their ability to
implement EU acquis. The Tacis programnme, by contrast, consists mainly of
generic programmes and projects for the transition to market-based democracies
More than a Neighbour
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similar to the assistance provided by international financial institutions (IFIs)
such as the World Bank, the IMF and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (EBRD).
Although Tacis is frequently criticized, it should be emphasized that the
programme has brought tangible benefits to Ukraine, with the nuclear safety
programme a notable success story. However, Ukraine’s new status as a direct
neighbour of the EU combined with the prospect of an upgraded relationship
with the EU entails different challenges for which the current Tacis approach is
less suitable. The upgraded EU-Ukrainian relationship could benefit from
assistance programmes targeted towards challenges more specifically linked to
the process of European integration and the EU, leaving other sources such as
the IFIs to provide more generic transition assistance. A new assistance
programme specifically targeted to Ukraine based on the Phare programmes of
assistance to candidate countries should thus be a central element of a new
agreement between Ukraine and the EU. In particular, assistance should support
the new agreement, the way that CARDS does for the Stabilization and Association
Agreements in the Western Balkans.
Furthermore, the fragmented system of EU assistance, whereby more than
half is provided bilaterally by the EU member states and through various IFIs,
entails problems of duplication and co-ordination, and limits the potential
political impact of such assistance. It would be desirable to channel more of the
EU’s combined assistance to Ukraine through the new Phare-like programme
proposed above.
As far as the EU’s priorities are concerned, and although a shift towards more
investment support may be desirable, institution- and capacity-building remains
a key challenge for Ukraine, and this requires mainly technical assistance. The
development of civil society in Ukraine is crucial for the realization of Ukraine’s
European choice. Thus the EU should support that process. Assistance could
originate both from the EU and particular member states’ funds. It would also
be advisable to assure as much involvement as possible from EU NGOs in the
implementation of projects in Ukraine.
That Ukraine is to become a new direct neighbour of the EU should also be
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reflected in the priorities of a new assistance programme. The negative effects
of EU enlargement will be more strongly felt in Western Ukraine. Greater
emphasis should thus be given to cross-border projects in Western Ukraine,
creating a bridgehead for safe investment activity there. In light of the long
common border between Ukraine and the enlarged EU, and considering the
growing importance of JHA within the EU, JHA should become a more central
part of EU economic assistance to Ukraine.
More than a Neighbour
